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LIST OF PARTIES
The above caption of this case before the Utah Court of
Appeals contains the names of all parties to the most recent
proceeding before the agency whose order is sought to be
reviewed.
This said proceeding was initiated by means of a request
directed to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on
behalf of petitioner that UADD reopen two matters and continue
administrative proceedings based on petitioner's charges against
Sears, Roebuck and Company, and its personnel director, Pat Muir.
This request was denied, and Sears has not been held to
answer.

However, a copy of that request and copies of subsequent

pertinent documents have been mailed to Sears' attorney, Roger
H. Bullock, 6th Floor Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111.
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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Subsection 78-2a-3(2)(a) of the Utah Code, since it
involves a review a final order from formal adjudicative
proceedings of a state agency other than an agency exceoted.
Jurisdiction was invoked by means of a Petition for Writ
of Review filed in compliance with Rule 14 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, namely, the Petition for Writ of Review
dated and filed April 4, 1994, seeking review of the respondent's
Order Denying Motion for Review dated March 10, 1994, which Order
included an affirmance of respondent's Administrative Law Judge's
Order of Dismissal dated June 10, 1993, which in turn denied an
evidentiary hearing to review the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division's decision dated May 7, 1993 refusing to resume
administrative action despite Petitioner's request dated March 4,
1993.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The petitioner asserts that the pertinent issues are as
follows:
1.

Where a charge of discrimination is timely filed

with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD), and UADD
subsequently discontinues its administrative process at the
request of the charging party, and a lawsuit based on the charges
is timely brought and then dismissed without prejudice to
administrative action, is UADD without jurisdiction to resume the
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administrative process on the basis that the request to resume is
made more than 180 days after the original discriminatory acts?
2.

Where a charge of discrimination is timely filed

with UADD, and UADD subsequently discontinues its administrative
process at the request of the charging party so that federal
remedies can be pursued, and a lawsuit based on the charges is
timely brought but federal remedies are not pursued, and the suit
is dismissed without prejudice to administrative action, is UADD
without jurisdiction to resume the administrative process on the
basis that an action under federal law has been commenced?
Both of these issues involve questions of correct
statutory interpretation for which there is no need to give
deference to the discretion of the agency.
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993).

King v. Industrial
The statutes give no

explicit nor implicit grant of discretion to the respondent to
interpret the extent of these limits to its jurisdiction.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The interpretation of the following subsections of
Section 34-35-7.1 of the Utah Code is determinative of the issues
in this appeal:
(l)(c)
under this
days after
prohibited

A request for agency action made
section shall be filed within 180
the alleged discriminatory or
employment practice occurred.

(16) The commencement of an action under
federal law for relief based uoon any act
prohibited by this chapter bars the
commencement or continuation of any
adjudicative proceeding before the Utah
Antidiscrimination Division in connection with
the same claims under this chapter. ...
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The interpretation of Section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code
may also govern:
If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than
upon the meritsf and the time limited either by
law or contract for commencing the same shall
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and
the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petition for Review in this matter was filed because
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) refused to resume
consideration of petitioner Federicofs claims of harassment and
discrimination against Sears, Roebuck and Company.
About a year after Federico originally filed her first
charge against Sears, there still having been no determination
and order, Federico had UADD discontinue its proceedings so she
could pursue the matter in court.

She then obtained an attorney

who filed an action against Sears in state court.

Sears moved to

dismiss on the basis that the exclusive forum for pursuing claims
under state law was UADD.

The judge agreed and dismissed the

action without prejudice to further agency action.
At that point, Federico could not pursue any rights
under federal law, either.

She therefore requested UADD resume

consideration of her charges against Sears.
Two reasons have been supplied by respondent for UADD's
denial of Federicofs request.

First, the request to reopen was

submitted more than 180 days after the acts of harassment and
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discrimination.

Second, Federico had invoked federal law by

requesting UADD to discontinue its proceedings, and so there
never again could be any continuation of agency action.
The facts in more detail are as follows, with citations
to the Record from the Agency (R.):
1.

Petitioner Federico filed two charges of

discrimination against Sears, the first one dated April 9, 1990
and the second dated September 21, 1990, with the UADD and the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
2.

R. 1-2.

When there had been no resolution by March of 1991,

Federico asked if there was a way she could move the case along.
It was suggested that she could get a right-to-sue letter, and an
attorney could then pursue the matter in court.
3.

R. 9.

She followed that suggested procedure, obtaining a

letter dated March 21, 1991 from UADD stating that no further
action would be taken by that agency, and a Notice of Right to
Sue dated April 18, 1991 from EEOC.
4.

R. 3-7.

Federico contacted an attorney who on or about July

16, 1991, filed an employment discrimination complaint in state,
rather than federal, district court.

There was never any

soecific reference to federal law in that action.
5.

R. 16-20.

After several months of discovery, Sears moved to

dismiss that action on the basis that the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act did not give jurisdiction to the district
court.

The case was accordingly dismissed without prejudice to

further agency action on October 19, 1992.

R. 9, 21-23.
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6.

A copy of the documents referred to hereafter were

generally contemporaneously mailed to the attorney Sears had
employed, Roger H. Bullock, 6th Floor Boston Building, 9 Exchanae
Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

R. 11, 26, 34, 38, 40.

attorney opposed Federico's pursuit of this matter.
7.

R. 28.

By letter dated March 4, 1993, Federico requested

UADD to resume consideration of her charges against Sears.
23, 8.

That

R. 9-

By letter dated May 7, 1993, UADD declined the request,

stating, "The time for filing has passed."
8.

R. 24.

On May 21, 1993, Federico requested an evidentiary

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

R. 25-26.

The

ALJ, Timothy C. Allen, denied this request on the basis that the
respondent Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction.

He

reasoned that since Federico had caused UADD to cease
consideration of her charges, her request to reopen those claims
had to be treated as new claims, and as such were filed after the
180-day limitation period.

Furthermore, the ALJ ruled that

federal action had been initiated, barring consideration of the
claims.

R. 29-30.
9.

Federico filed a timely Motion for Review, dated

July 8, 1993.

R. 32-34.

This was followed by an Order Denyinq

Motion for Review dated March 10, 1994, affirming the Order of
Dismissal on the grounds set forth by the ALJ.

R. 35-37.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The legislature has enacted a law to remedy problems

found in the work place.

This law should be liberally construed
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to effectuate its purpose.

There are constraints to avoid

duplicate action, but these constraints must not be interpreted
to bar any remedy.
2.

A request for an agency to resume action regarding a

prohibited employment practice need not be made within 180 days
of the occurrence of that practice.

The 180 dav limitation only

applies to the request for the agency to initiate action in the
first instance.

The saving statute and the principles evidenced

in that statute and in the rule pertaining to amending pleadings
demonstrate that a subsequent request for agency action need not
be filed as soon as an initial request.
3.

The bar against agency action upon commencement of

an action under federal law does not apply merely because an
aggrieved party has a right to file such an action.

Even the

filing of such an action does not prohibit resumption of agency
action where no decision under federal law has been nor can be
made.
action.

Resumption of agency action would not then duplicate court
Rather, it would provide the only possible remedy for

the prohibited employment practices.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT SHOULD BE LIBERALLY

CONSTRUED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS REMEDIAL PURPOSES.
It is a. remedial statute.
The language of the Antidiscrimination Act, Chapter 35
of Title 34 of the Utah Code, demonstrates a clear intent on the
part of the legislature to root out discrimination by employers.
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For example, Section 34-35-5 of the Code contains
numerous subsections granting various powers to the Utah
Antidiscrimination Division (UADD), enabling it to remedy
wrongful acts against employees and orevent their recurrence.

It

is clear that these powers are expansive to fully allow the UADD
to accomplish those purposes.

The UADD can appoint

investigators, publish rules, pass upon complaints, hold hearings
and subpoena witnesses, issue publications, recommend policies
and legislation, conduct educational programs, and so on.
In Section 34-35-7 of the Utah Code, the Industrial
Commission is given the responsibility to act when a person
claims to be aggrieved by a discriminatory and prohibited
employment practice.

But it is not granted the power to

redefine a "prohibited employment practice" nor to limit the
extent of its own jurisdiction.
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah
436, 441, 140 P.2d 644 (1943), the Supreme Court stated, "We have
held that the Industrial Act must be liberally construed and that
by such construction we should attempt to effectuate its
beneficent and humane objects."
Likewise the employment act seeking to remedy
discrimination problems must be liberally construed to effectuate
its purposes.
This in accordance with the general principle found in
the statement, "This Court's primary responsibility in construing
legislation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature."
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American Coal Co, v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984).
The Act has three purposes.
The Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act evidences three
legislative intentions pertinent to this case.
As mentioned above, the first and major legislative
intent is to give employees a remedy for wrongful acts committed
against employees, and to prevent the recurrence of such acts.
That is shown in the sections cited above.
Secondly, the legislature evidenced an intent to quickly
make the offending party aware of the claims against it by
requiring the charging party to request agency action within 180
days after the wrongful acts.

Subsection 34-35-7.1(1) (c ).

Thirdly, the legislature has intended to avoid a
duplicate adjudication in the pursuit of a remedy for wrongful
acts.

This is shown in subsections 34-35-7.1(15) and (16). In

subsection (15), agency orocedures are made the exclusive remedy
under state law.

Subsection (16) follows, prohibiting the

simultaneous pursuit of federal and state remedies.
However, the first purpose is thwarted, and the second
and third purposes are not advanced, if the Act is construed to
deny UADD jurisdiction to resume agency consideration of a claim,
no matter what, where either (1) the request to resume action is
made more than 180 days after the occurrence giving rise to the
claim, or (2) agency action has once been discontinued to permit
pursuit of federal claims.
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2.

A REQUEST TO RESUME AGENCY ACTION NEED NOT BE MADE

WITHIN THE 180 DAYS APPLICABLE TO AN INITIAL REQUEST.
A request to resume action is not "a request for agency action."
Subsection 34-35-7.1(1) (c ) of the Utah Code states:
A request for agency action made under this
section shall be filed within 180 days after
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice occurred.
An issue has arisen as to the meaning of "a request for
agency action made under this section."
The Industrial Commission has determined that Federico's
request of the UADD to resume consideration of her claims is "a
request for agency action made under this section."

However, a

request to resume consideration of claims is not identified in
Section 34-35-7.1.
The requests identified in Section 34-35-7.1 include the
initial request referred to in subsection (1), a request by an
employer for assistance as specified in subsection (2), a request
for an evidentiary hearing described in subsections (4) and (5),
and a request for review allowed in subsection (11). It is
unreasonable to construe "a request for agency action made under
this section" to mean any one of these requests, and to thus
require that they all be made "within 180 days after the alleged
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred."
Furthermore, the language of subsection (7) would
indicate that "a request for agency action" refers only to the
initial request:
Prior to commencement of an evidentiary
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hearing, the party filing the request for
agency action may reasonably and fairly amend
any allegation, and the respondent may amend
its answer. Those amendments may be made
during or after a hearing but only with
permission of the presiding officer. [Emphasis
added.]
Thus, although an amendment may request additional
agency action, it would appear to fall outside of the definition
of "a request for agency action" that would have to be made
"within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice occurred."
This was the result in the case of Simmons v. Mountain
Bell, 806 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1990).
In that case, Simmons filed a complaint with the Montana
Human Rights Commission (HRC) on January 21, 1981 for Mountain
Bell's discrimination against her based on her physical handicap.
Mountain Bell terminated her employment on June 10, 1981.

So she

filed an amended complaint with HRC on January 19, 1982 alleging
retaliation.
Mountain Bell argued that this amendment was barred,
being filed more than 180 days after the termination.

The

Montana Supreme Court found that it was not barred, since Rule
15(c) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an
amendment relates back to the initial filing.
So the statutory reference to "a request for agency
action made under this section" that must be made "within 180
days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice occurred" would seem to be restricted to the initial
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request for the agency to take action concerning a matter or
related matters.
This idea of "a request for agency action" being
different from its ordinary meaning, and having aspects of a term
of art, is bolstered by its use in the Administrative Procedures
Act.

Subsection 63-46b-3(l) states that adjudicative

proceedings are commenced by (a) an agency itself giving notice
of agency action or by "(b) a request for agency action, if
proceedings are commenced by persons other than the agency."
It also appears that it is appropriate to refer to rules
and statutes governing civil actions in general when deciding
questions pertaining to actions before an agency.

Subsection 63-

46b-7(l) provides for discovery, referring as needed to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Then subsection 63-46b-7(2) grants

subpoena and other powers, with such powers evidently governed by
statutes applicable in civil cases.
Thus "a request for agency action" would appear to be
analogous to a complaint in a civil action.
Action by UADD was stayed.
Federico's request that the agency discontinue its
processes should be construed as analogous to a request for a
stay before a court.
This would seem particularly true in light of the fact
that Federico, like many others in her position before an agency,
was not represented by legal counsel.

Actions before agencies

are generally not governed by evidence and other rules as strict
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as those governing court actions where legal counsel are the
norm.

See subsection 63-46b-8(1)(c).

An agency order must give

notice of the right and time limits for requesting further
review.

Subsection 63-46b-10(1)(g).

Construing the agency

action to have been stayed, rather than dismissed, would comport
better with the tenor of agency actions.
As it is, the Industrial Commission has taken the
position that though unrepresented, Federico forever and
unalterably forfeited all rights she had against Sears under Utah
law when she obtained a letter from the UADD discontinuing its
administrative process.

Federico was not clearly informed

beforehand that the Commission would take such a rigid posture.
Furthermore, a stay would have accomplished the purpose
of allowing the pursuit of federal remedies.
For example, in the case of National Cash Register v.
Riner, 413 A.2d 890 (Del. Super. 1979), the court found that the
ADEA did not require that state action be dismissed, but merely
stayed.

Likewise, under federal and Utah law, there could be a

simultaneous staying of the state action and initiation of an
action under the Civil Rights Act.
The saving statute preserves jurisdiction.
Even if UADD's discontinuance of administrative
proceedings is deemed analogous to a dismissal, that dismissal
must be without prejudice.

Although Federico obtained no relief

from UADD, it was not based on any failure on the merits.

As

acknowledged by the Commission's Administrative Law Judge in the
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Order of Dismissal dated June 10, 1993, "presumably a new request
for agency action could be made and could be acted upon, if
timely."

R. 29.
However, if the discontinuance of agency action is

deemed a dismissal, and the request to resume such action deemed
a refiling, then that request has indeed been timely made, based
on Section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code:
If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than
upon the merits, and the time limited either by
law or contract for commencing the same shall
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and
the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure.
This Utah saving statute is not superseded, preempted,
or contravened by any other statute dealing with actions before
state agencies in general, or dealing with the specific subject
and the specific agencies involved in the instant matter.
Section 78-12-5.3 of the Utah Code defines "action" as a
"civil action wherein affirmative relief is sought."
not apply to a criminal action.

So it does

But there is no reason to

believe that in the nineteenth century, when the legislature
enacted substantially this same statute, the legislative intent
was to exclude all actions before an agency.

Section 2893, Rev.

St. 1898.
So it is entirely appropriate that the statute apply in
the instant matter, if there has been a deemed dismissal.
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The saving statute should be liberally construed.
The saving statute is remedial and should receive a
liberal construction.
A statute extending the time for the
institution of a new action on failure of the
original action for reasons other than on the
merits should be liberally construed in
furtherance of its purpose. 54
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, Sec. 240 at 320.
Utah courts historically have followed this principle in
giving a liberal construction to the saving statute.
In the case of Standard Fed. Sav. Ji Loan v. Kirkbride,
821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991), Standard Federal filed a timely
complaint seeking a deficiency judgment following a sale under a
trust deed.

Summons were not timely served within 120 days after

this filing, and the case was dismissed.
Kirkbride first argued that the following language of
section 5-1-32 of the Utah Code barred any refiling if the
initial three months had expired:
At any time within three months after any
sale of prooerty under a trust deed, as
hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the
obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security ....
The Utah Supreme Court did not interpret that statute to
provide such an unalterable deadline for a refiling:
Kirkbride and Soule contend that the
language indicates a purpose to bar any action
not initiated within three months and then
resolved on the merits for the plaintiff.
There is nothing in the language of the statute
suggesting an intent to reach such a draconian
result. Standard, supra, 821 P.2d at 1138.
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Likewise, there is nothing in the language of subsection
34-35-7.l(l)(c) of the Utah Code, the statute pertaining to a
request for agency action in the instant matter, that would show
the intent to reach such a draconian result:
A request for agency action made under this
section shall be filed within 180 days after
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice occurred.
Kirkbride also argued that the saving statute should
extend general limitations only, not the specific three-month
limitation for filing a deficiency action after a trustee's sale
on a trust deed.

The Utah Supreme Court was unpersuaded.

The relevant inquiry is whether the legislature made
plain an intention to bar forever claims of those who
are guilty of a procedural misstep. [Citations] As
previously noted, we find no such indication here.
:id. at 1138.
Likewise, the relevant inquiry in the instant matter is
whether the legislature made plain an intention to give one year
for refiling to those who are guilty of a procedural misstep in
a district court where they would be expected to have counsel,
but not one day to those who are guilty of a procedural misstep
before an agency where the rules are relaxed and attorneys are
less common.

To find such an intention would be to construe a

remedial statute much too strictly.
Sears has not been prejudiced.
The Supreme Court then examined the purpose for the
comparatively short three month period.

In exchange for a speedy

remedy of foreclosure and sale, the creditor had the obligation
to promptly put the debtor on notice it was seeking a deficiency
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by commencing an action.

The Court found that purpose was

accomplished, even though Kirkbride managed to have the first
action dismissed.
Likewise, in exchange for a simplified agency procedure,
an employee has the obligation to promptly put the employer on
notice he or she is alleging a prohibited employment practice by
promptly requesting agency action.

The employer received that

notice in the instant matter.
Not only did Federico give notice of her allegations
against Sears by means of the request for agency action, but her
actions thereafter fully showed her intent to continue pursuit of
this matter.

She did nothing to lull Sears into feeling that she

would not pursue the matter or to leave Sears in a lengthy period
of uncertainty.

As shown in the chronology appearing above,

Federico!s longest period of inaction was less than 6 months, the
period after her state action was dismissed without prejudice to
agency action, and before the filing of her request that the
agency resume action.

This was much less than the statutory

period of one year.
3.

TAKING THE FIRST STEP TO ASSERT FEDERAL RIGHTS DOES

NOT FOREVER PRECLUDE ASSERTION OF STATE RIGHTS.
Federico did not commence a federal action.
Subsection 34-35-7.1(16) of the Utah Code states:
(16) The commencement of an action under
federal law for relief based upon any act
prohibited by this chapter bars the
commencement or continuation of any
adjudicative proceeding before the Utah
Antidiscrimination Division in connection with
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the same claims under this chapter.

...

An issue has arisen as to the meaning of "the
commencement of an action under federal law."
On page two of its Order Denying Motion for Review, the
Industrial Commission stated:
The record is clear that Ms. Federico
withdrew her claim of discrimination from the
Anti-Discrimination Division and then filed a
court action to enforce her claim under federal
law. R. 36.
The record is indeed clear that Federico took steps to
assert her rights in court.

It is not clear that she "filed a

court action to enforce her claim under federal law."
There was reference in the Complaint filed in state
court to the EEOC, but no other reference to federal law.

R. 18.

It was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

R. 22.

This dismissal was based on a motion citing Utah law, not federal
law.

R. 9.

So Federico apparently did not file "a court action

to enforce her claim under federal law."
The state court may have lacked federal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the state court in which Federico filed her
complaint may not have had jurisdiction to enforce discrimination
claims under the federal law.

There has been a split of

authority as to whether state courts can exercise jurisdiction
over Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
In Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 874 F.2d 402
(7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit found that the state courts
had concurrent jurisdiction.

In so doing, it acknowledged that
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the opposite result had been reached by the Ninth Circuit in
Valenzuela y_^ Kraft, Inc. , 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1984), which in
turn had relied on dictum from the Supreme Court's decision in
Lehman v^ Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 2703
n. 12, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981).

It also acknowledged the opposite

result in the case of Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d
110, 112 (3rd Cir. 1986), and overruled its decision in Brown v
Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 852 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1988)
which had assumed that Title VII jurisdiction was exclusively
federal.
So when Federico filed an action in state court, there
may well have been no "commencement of an action under federal
law" even possible in that forum.
Federico lost all federal rights.
Furthermore, by the time the state court action had been
dismissed, there was definitely no possibility of a "commencement
of an action under federal law."
The Tenth Circuit, which governs the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, has ruled that if an
action under Title VII is dismissed without prejudice, the filing
period is not tolled by that dismissed action, nor is the action
saved by a state saving statute.
School Dist. No. 1,

Brown v. Hartshorne Public

926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1991).

There is

no federal saving statute, and the existence of a federal statute
of limitations renders a state saving statute inapplicable.
Thus in her state action, Federico did not specifically
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assert her rights to relief under federal law, and perhaps could
not have asserted such rights; and ever since dismissal of that
action, she clearly was barred from asserting those rights.
So the record is not "clear that Ms. Federico withdrew
her claim of discrimination from the Anti-Discrimination Division
and then filed a court action to enforce her claim under federal
law."

R. 36.

And it is not clear that there has been a

"commencement of an action under federal law."

Subsection 34-35-

7.1(16) of the Utah Code.
A preparatory step is not the same as commencing.
Now it is clear that Federico took action that made
possible the "commencement of an action under federal law," but
making it possible is not the same as doing it.
A "commencement of an action under federal law" must be
defined as an overt filing.
preparatory step.

It cannot be defined as taking a

To define commencement as taking a preparatory

step would result in discontinuing every "adjudicative proceeding
before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division" that has been filed,
since every filing includes a filing with the federal EEOC, a
necessary predicate to enforcement under federal law.

R. 1, 2.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1).
Continuance of agency action is only temporarily barred.
As a further matter of statutory construction, in
reaching its ruling, the Industrial Commission has necessarily
construed subsection 34-35-7.1(16) of the Utah Code to include
the words "forever and unalterably":
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(16) The commencement of an action under
federal law for relief based upon any act
prohibited by this chapter [forever and
unalterably] bars the commencement or
continuation of any adjudicative proceeding
before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in
connection with the same claims under this
chapter, ... [Bracketed words added.]
There aopears to be no legislative intent that would be
furthered by thus augmenting the effect of this exception to the
availability of a remedy under the act.
It seems more compatible with the purpose of the act to
construe this exception to bar any adjudicative proceeding before
the UADD from the time an action under federal law is commenced,
and continuing thereafter unless and until a decision on the
merits has not and cannot be rendered under federal law.
In the case of Corrente v. St. Josephf s Hosp. and Health
Center, 730 F. Supp. 493 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), the court examined the
relationship between state and federal discrimination actions and
the purposes behind the interrelating procedures.

Specifically,

the court examined the purposes behind the ADEA provision that a
federal action would supersede (construed to mean "stay," _Id. at
497) any state action.
The result reached in the Corrente opinion was that it
was most likely that the purpose was to conserve judicial
resources, while giving some primacy to the federal action.

Id.

at 499.
That would also be the most logical purpose of the bar
in subsection 34-35-7.1(16) against beginning or continuing
action before UADD once an action under federal law has been
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commenced.
Only a decision on the merits is a complete bar.
It is illogical to attribute to the legislature a desire
to withhold from a wronged employee any possibility of any relief
merely because he or she has attempted to enforce perceived
federal rights.

This is contrary to the intent of the

legislature to ensure the availability of a remedy.
As indicated above, if the UADD proceeds to adjudicate
this matter, there will be no duplication, and there will be no
lack of deference to any decision on the merits.

There will only

be, finally, a forum in which the validity of Federico's charges
can be determined.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court should decide that UADD has
jurisdiction to consider on the merits Federico's two charges of
discrimination against Sears, the first one dated April 9, 1990
and the second dated September 21, 1990, filed with UADD under
its numbers 90-0262 and 91-0008, respectively.
This decision would be based upon a liberal construction
of remedial statutes to further their purposes.
Federico's request for UADD to continue its
administrative proceedings would either not be construed as an
initial request for agency action required to be filed within 180
days after the offending occurrences, or it would be deemed saved
by the saving statute.
Also, her actions in originally discontinuing agency
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action would either not be deemed the commencement of an action
under federal law, or the bar against continuation of state
action would not be deemed to extend past the point in time when
a decision on the merits has not and cannot be rendered under
federal law.
Thus there is no impediment for this Court to decide
that UADD can proceed to consider Federico's two charges of
discrimination against Sears.
DATED this 3*^

day of

<2^^

, 1994.

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^

LYNN P. HEWARD
Attorney for Charging Party
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Lynn P. Heward. Attorney
923 East b350 South, #K

Salt Lake City. Utah 84117
He:

Jennie Federico v. Sears, Roebuck & Company
UADD NOS. 90-0262 and 91-0008

Dear Mr. Heward:
Regretfully 1 must decline your request to refile an action
in the above case. The time for filing has passed, and our
documents show that Ms. Federico clearly requested that we
discontinue our administrative processes.
We do not issue
right to sue letters for state court, and our letter cannot
be construed to be one. Only the EEOC (a federal agency)
issues right to sue letters for federal court.
Apparently
your client's previous attorney did not review the law in
this area.
Sincerely.

Anna R. Jensen
Director
ARJ/ms

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6615
JENNIE FEDERICO,
Charging Party,
vs.

*
*
*

ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

*

SEARS,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*

UADD Nos. 90-0262 &
91-0008

*********************************

The request for an evidentiary hearing in the
entitled matter to review de novo the denial by the Utah
Discrimination Division dated May 7, 1993 having been
considered, and it having been determined that the charging
has failed to overcome the jurisdictional problems with this
the request must be dismissed for the following reasons:

above
Antiduly
party
case,

By letter dated March 4, 1993, the charging party requested
that the Anti-Discrimination Division reopen her files in the above
captioned matters and continue its investigation. This request was
denied by letter dated May 7, 1993. On May 21, 1993 the charging
party requested an evidentiary hearing or review. I will treat the
UADD Director's letter of May 7, 1992 as a denial of the charging
party's request for agency action pursuant to U.C.A. S 63-46b3(3)(d)(ii). The charging party's letter of May 21, 1993 will be
treated as a request for an evidentiary hearing under U.C.A. S 6346b-3(3)(d)(ii).
The charging party filed a charge of discrimination with the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division on April 9, 1990. She later
requested on March 11, 1991 that her charge be withdrawn. Her
request to withdraw her charge was approved by the Director on
March 21, 1991.
Examination of the record indicates that the
charging party intended to request a right to sue letter from EEOC
and pursue the matter in federal court.
Instead of filing an
action in federal court, however, the charging party filed an
action in state district court. This action was dismissed by the
state district court on October 19, 1992, for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Although the district court dismissed the
matter without prejudice, the Industrial Commission cannot now
reassume jurisdiction because it too lacks jurisdiction.
Under the statute in effect at the time of the charging
party's withdrawal of her charge and at the time of the
withdrawal's approval and the issuance of the "Notice of Right to
Sue", presumably a new request for agency action could be made and
could be acted upon, if timely (the 180 day state filing provision
has been in effect since legislative change in 1985). However, the
charging party's letters of March 4, 1993, and May 21, 1993, are
both well beyond the 180 day mandate of the statute. Further, if
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ORDER
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the current statutory version as found in Section 34-35-7•1(16) is
considered, as may be procedurally appropriate, the requests made
by the charging party's letters of March 4, 1993, and May 21, 1993,
could not be accepted because the Industrial C o m m i s s i o n s AntiDiscrimination Division is prohibited from "commencement or
continuation of any adjudicative proceeding" once any action under
federal law is initiated.
It is clear that the charging party's renewed request for
agency action is well beyond the 180 day period for filing a charge
of discrimination under U.C.A. S 34-35-7.1(1)(c).
Therefore, we
have no other option but to deny her request as untimely filed.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charging party's request for
an evidentiary hearing to reopen her charges of discrimination
before the Industrial Commission is HEREBY DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission
within thirty (3 0) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or
appeal.
A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
state the date upon which it was mailed; be filed with the
undersigned, and be sent to each'party.

'Allen
Presiding/Administrative Law Judge
day of

Certified this
ATTEST:
__
y~

/

Patricia O. Ashby /
Commission Secretary

K^n.r.
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE NO. 90-0262 & 91-0008
JENNIE FEDERICO,

*
Applicant,

vs.
SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Jennie Federico seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's
Order which dismissed, on jurisdictional grounds, her claims that
Sears unlawfully discriminated against her.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann.
§34-35-7.1(11) and Utah Administrative Code R560-1-4.5.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The pertinent facts are not disputed:
1.
During 1990, Ms. Federico filed discrimination charge
against Sears with UADD and the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (MEE0Clf) .
2.
In March 1991, Ms. Federico advised UADD and EEOC that
she intended to file a discrimination action against Sears in
federal court.
She asked
both agencies to stop their
administrative actions and requested a "Right To Sue" letter from
EEOC.
3.
UADD acknowledged receipt of Ms. Federico's request and
asked her to confirm her request. On March 12, 1991, she provided
such confirmation, stating:
I request the withdrawal of my charge because I have
exhausted the administrative remedies and intend to file
in federal court.
4.
On March 21, 1991, the UADD Director sent a letter to Ms.
Federico acknowledging her request and officially closing the file
for UADD and forwarding it to EEOC. On April 18, 1991, EEOC issued
a Right To Sue letter.
EEOC then closed Ms. Federico's
discrimination claims.
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5.
Ms. Federico then filed an employment discrimination
complaint against Sears in state, rather than federal, district
court.
On October 19, 1992, the state court dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
6.
On March 4, 1993, Ms. Federico asked UADD to reopen her
prior claims against Sears.
By letter dated May 7, 1993, UADD
declined to reopen the claims on the grounds M (t)he time for filing
has passed.If
7.
Ms. Federico then requested an evidentiary hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge on the issue of her right to reopen her
claims. The ALJ dismissed Ms. Federico's request, reasoning that
because Ms. Federico had withdrawn her original charges of
discrimination, her request to reopen such claims must be treated
as new claims that were outside the 180 day limitation for filing
such claims.
8.
The ALJ also concluded that under Utah Code Ann. §34-357.1(16), M the Industrial Commission's Anti-Discrimination Division
is prohibited
from
'commencement
or continuation
of
any
adjudicative proceeding' once any action under federal law is
initiated."
9.
Ms. Federico then filed a timely Motion For Review with
the Industrial Commission.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As noted in the ALJ's decision, Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(16)
prevents the Anti-Discrimination Division from pursuing any further
action in this matter once any action under federal law is
initiated.
The record is clear that Ms. Federico withdrew her claim of
discrimination from the Anti-Discrimination Division and then filed
a court action to enforce her claim under federal law. Under the
plain language of §34-35-7.1(16), the Anti-Discrimination Division
is barred from further action on Ms. Federico's claims.
Additionally, for the reasons given in the ALJ's decision, the
Commission finds that Ms. Federico's request for agency action is
barred by the 180 day filing requirement of Utah Code Ann. §34-357.1(1)
Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the UADD
has no jurisdiction to consider Ms. Federico's claims further, and
that the ALJ was correct in dismissing her request for an
evidentiary hearing.
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DECISION
The Industrial Commission of Utah hereby affirms the ALJ's
Order of Dismissal in this matter. It is so ordered.
DATED this jQ ^""day of gobruary, 1994.

Commissioner

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
For Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this
Order.

